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INTRODUCTION
Many Latin American countries have undertaken new economic reforms since the
mid-80s. This includes trade liberalization, which breaks a long tradition of importsubstituting industrialization (ISI) policies in the region, following the wider view that
economic openness contributes to growth, while ISI policies do not help to close the
income gap between Latin American countries and the countries in the developed world.
Instead, average growth in Latin America has been both erratic and modest, in sharp
contrast to that of East Asian countries, with their outward-oriented trade policies and
subsequent growth in per capita income (Ahumada and Sanguinetti 328).
Throughout the 1990s, successful Latin American politicians took their
inspiration from the “Washington Consensus” and won elections by promising closer ties
to the United States. Argentina was no exception, and the country was invited to become
part of a select group of “major non-NATO allies” because of its strong political and
military links with the US in 1998 (The Lost Continent 1). The country also introduced
market-oriented reforms that were so extensive that the right-of-center Heritage
Foundation ranked the country’s economy among the world’s “freest” in 1999 (The
Politics of Argentina’s Meltdown 29). Carlos Ménem even spoke at the 1998 joint annual
meeting of the boards of governors of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the
World Bank Group, stating, “we must wipe out the last vestiges of protectionism and
production subsidies still lingering in the developed economies if we are to achieve free
and fair trade” (Ménem 5).
Yet only 10 years later, in 2009, Argentine President Néstor Kirchner, who
represented a left-of-center coalition that ran on a platform of undoing previous
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“neoliberal excesses” and was constantly derisive towards the United States, had an
approval rating of 70 percent. In just those 10 years, running for political office in Latin
America on the grounds of privatization, free trade, or US support went from being the
definition of electoral success, to political suicide. Aggrieved and impatient Latin
Americans who were on the lookout for new candidates that broke with what had been
established as the status quo opened the door for candidates like Néstor and Cristina
Kirchner — candidates who were reminiscent of traditional populism, used massive
political spending as a crutch, and scapegoated the private sector to benefit their
popularity (The Lost Continent 3-6).
Using the definition of populism as the political mobilization of the masses from a
top-down approach (Levitsky and Roberts 6), it can be easy to fall into the trap of
defining populism as any economic measure that appeals to the masses and brings
additional popularity to the political leader. This is an overly broad perspective of
populism. Others, using a political approach, categorize populism as a theory that
promotes a disastrous type of macroeconomic development. This characterization of
populism includes using political power to finance redistributive policies in favor of the
poor to improve quality of life for previously excluded sectors of society, which create
debt and inflation in the long-term. This is followed by major financial crisis, which
necessitates painful economic reforms that ultimately deepen inequality and poverty. This
view falls short, however, in that it does not explain why leaders such as Argentina’s
Carlos Ménem instituted neoliberal reforms under the argument that is was the only way
to achieve stable macroeconomic development (Kaltwasser 496).
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This paper, however, looks specifically at the openness of the economy to the
world and the integration of the economy into the international trade environment as a
leverage point for rethinking populism. It starts with an overview of populism and the
Kirchner administration as a whole. The paper then opens the theoretical space through a
discussion of strategic trade and of the relationship between trade and populism, which
leads into a discussion of trade policy in Argentina over time and during the Kirchner
administration specifically, as well as a quantitative analysis of trade data from the
period. To get a better perspective on the implications of the trade policy, interviews were
conducted with scholars on the topic, who have also experienced the effect of the
Kirchner administration and different trade policies in Argentina firsthand. The
information garnered from these interviews in incorporated throughout the paper, and is
used as a lens to approach the topic (Appendix 1).
The question at hand is if understanding trade and populism helps inform an
understanding of concerns about populist governments in terms of trade. Countries in
Latin America have been plagued by ISI policies, while East Asian countries saw success
with export-led growth. Export expansion and import substitution are not contradictory
policies; in fact, they complement each other. ISI is one stage of development policy, and
export-led growth is a second stage (Amsden 172). Unfortunately, most Latin American
countries never made it to the export expansion and trade openness stage of policy. The
region came closest when many of its countries embraced the neoliberal policies of the
Washington Consensus, which included the recommendation of moderate general tariffs
at 10 to 20 percent levels, although it did allow for heavier temporary tariffs for infant
industries (Jordan). The recommendation of the Washington Consensus to remove
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government-imposed barriers to imports, exports, foreign investment, and foreign
currency transactions was a sharp contrast to the long-held conviction in countries, like
Argentina, that developing countries needed to protect their economies from exploitative
international system (Fads and Fashion in Economic Reforms). Yet, because of more
neoliberal policies, the average tariff levels, maximum tariffs, and non-tariff restrictions
in the region of Latin America all declined by more than 50 percent between 1985 and
1995, at the height of neoliberal reforms (Jordan). As shown, neoliberal policies have a
clear association with trade, but the relationship between populism and trade is much less
evident. This paper asks if trade is a critical part of populism, and ultimately confirms the
null hypothesis.

OVERVIEW OF POPULISM
This paper views populism, a style and rhetoric of politics seen frequently in the
leadership of Latin America as a region and Argentina specifically, as a top-down
political mobilization of mass constituencies by personalistic leaders who challenge the
elite, either political or economic, on behalf of a vaguely defined people (Levitsky and
Roberts 6). The elements of populism are 1) the use of state resources, 2) a goal of
maintaining a coalition of both elites and anti-elites, and 3) an objective of undermining
the brakes that limit executive power. In democratic constitutions, there is a series of
articles designed to prevent the president from doing what he or she pleases without
oversight. The first part of this definition is important, as populism always needs a
durable source of resources in its battle against institutionalism. To support itself,
populism needs to take sole control of state resources. Although no political leader likes
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to live in a world of checks and balances, some presidents are more respectful of the
counterweights in place than others. These presidents comply with the orders of the court,
respect the Central Bank’s autonomy, cooperate with the opposition when appropriate,
and respond to journalists’ questions; presidents that do the opposite compete for the title
of populist. Inherent to populism is a bipolar coalition of elites and anti-elites, a group of
two extremes that creates a possibility of a battle against the breaks and counterweights
imposed on the executive power. The first extreme is that of marginal social sectors,
typically the workers and peasants. The second extreme is that of the elites, or groups
with political privileges before the arrival of the populist. In the case of Juan Domingo
Perón’s classic populism, this meant members of the military and great industrials. The
government offers members of the elite large contracts and protections, and they offer the
anti-elite sectors positions of employments, subsidies, and welfare programs; the citizens
not considered to be part of their movement receive little (¿Qué es el populismo? 1-2).
Most populist figures, including many discussed here, cannot be clearly placed on
the conventional left-right continuum (Levitsky and Roberts 6). Despite this lack of
defined populist ideology, there are still some patterns in the practice of populism.
Common populist goals in the past have been the mobilization of support from organized
labor and lower-middle-class groups; the achievement of complementary backing from
domestically-oriented businesses; and the political isolation of the rural oligarchy, foreign
enterprises, and large-scale domestic industrial elite (Kaufman and Stallings 8). Populists
that lean to the eft tend to promote income distribution, state intervention in the economy,
and, above all, welfare programs. Populists that identify more with the right end of the
political spectrum tend to use the ideology of national security to promote populism, and
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also typically promote spending on infrastructure (¿Qué es el populismo? 2). These
political objectives are by fed economic dissatisfaction and by initial feelings that the
country’s situation can be improved upon. When political policymakers assume
leadership, they are known to reject the conservative paradigm and refuse to
acknowledge or abide by any macroeconomic policy constraints, leading to policies that
emphasize reactivation, redistribution of income, and economic restructuration. The latter
is done to save on foreign exchange and support higher levels of growth and real wages
(Dornbusch and Edwards 9-10).
Populist leaders usually make use of the economic tools of budget deficits,
nominal wage increases combined with price controls, and exchange-rate controls. The
budget deficits stimulate domestic demand, the wage increases stimulate income
redistribution, and the exchange-rate controls cut inflation and raises wages and profits in
specific sectors (Kaufman and Stallings 8). Historically, most populist movements have
been classified by three key features: multiclass incorporation of the masses, primarily
urban workers, but also middle-class sectors; a paternalist, even charismatic, leadership
that mobilizes from the top down and makes such a multi-class coalition possible; and
integrationist, nationalist development programs that allow the state to push both ISI and
redistributive measures for populist supporters (Drake 36).
The macroeconomics of populism can be divided into two topics: the properties of
the economy’s real equilibrium and macroeconomic adjustment. In terms of the first
topic, populism makes the assumption that the economy can do better, and calls for
increased government spending to accomplish this vision. In terms of the latter topic,
populist policies call for the heterodox programs of price and exchange controls,
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combined with the freezing of wages and public tariffs. Inflation is considered a
consequence of income struggle, and demand expansion is not considered inflationary.
The basic strategy should theoretically focus on an agreement between economic groups
to stop the income struggle (Sturzenegger 79).
Populist administrations can usually be divided into four phases: diagnosis and
prescription, bottlenecks, desperation, and stabilization. In the first phase, policymakers
are justified in their economic policies, as the economy experience high rates of
employment, real wages, and output growth. In this stage, macroeconomic policies
employed by the government are successful. This success begins to encounter obstacles
in stage two, however, with economic bottlenecks compounded by an increase in
domestic demand and a growing lack of foreign exchange. This struggle escalates in
phase three, and it becomes clear that the government is in a desperate situation. In this
stage, there are shortages, a large expansion of inflation, and a foreign exchange gap that
creates capital flight and demonetization of the economy. The budget deficit, which was a
policy tool used to stimulate domestic demand, backfires and deteriorates violently,
resulting from a decrease in tax collection and increasing budgetary demands with
subsidy costs. The government often attempts to handle this through decreasing subsidies
and by a real depreciation. Additionally, real wages, which the government had tried to
increase, fall massively. During this phase, many policies are unstable. This instability is
addressed through an orthodox stabilization in the form of a new government, a transition
in the form of a major political change (Dornbusch and Edwards 11-12).
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POPULISM IN LATIN AMERICA
Populism has typically ravaged countries with high inflation and the collapse of
the economic situation, and has often required the populist country to turn to the IMF to
implement a restrictive and costly stabilization program (Dornbusch and Edwards 1).
Despite what appears to be a self-destructive element of populism, there must be a reason
for this political repetition, leading to the assumption that populist leaders may have some
kind of larger strategy. From one perspective, populism provided a coherent political
response to the dislocations caused by the increasing tempo of industrialization, social
differentiation, and urbanization. Furthermore, while it may appear that more recent
populist leaders have forgotten the drastic negative effects of previous populist
experiments, considering the political and institutional incentives and constraints can
shed light on the policies as rational responses to imperfect political incentives (Alesina
43).
In addition to strategic considerations, populism seems to be more compatible
with the politics of Latin America specifically, to the point that Kaufman and Stallings
argue that populism is rooted in Latin America’s distributive political struggles that
began at the beginning of the twentieth century. The strong export oligarchies that
dominated Latin American politics in the beginning of the nineteenth century resulted in
a high concentration of income and assets as well as a sharp division between employers
and workers in industry and services versus the primary products export sector controlled
by the traditional oligarchy, two characteristics that made Latin America distinct from
other regions.
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These sharp class and sectoral divisions proved to be a fertile breeding ground for
populism in many Latin American countries. Highly unequal societies place upperincome groups in a good position to resist direct taxation, which placed a major limit on
the capacity of Latin American governments to deal with distributive pressures in their
country within the constraints of a growth-oriented export model. Additionally, in
practice, the ISI policies proved to be a link to populism. ISI provided intellectual
justification policies that resulted in populism when carried to extremes. ISI placed an
emphasis on the domestic market, the logic of which led to justifying large wage
increases and higher government spending, both of which continued easily into populism.
The focus on domestic markets also allowed for policies that protected new internal
markets, specifically high tariffs and overvalued exchange rates. The industrialization
process itself created groups that supported the ISI policies, and, in turn, the populist
policies. The new domestic industries protected through ISI policies, along with the
public sector, provided the main source of employment for the urban middle classes and
blue-collar unions, which were also the groups in the best position to mobilize in support
of income distribution. These groups experienced short-term gains from policies that
combined fiscal expansionism and an overvalued currency.
Several other factors have contributed to the prevalence of populist policies in
Latin America. Incentives for politicians for the anti-elite coalition of unions, whitecollar employees, and import-substituting industrialists that characterizes populism are
relatively weak in systems where one or two multi-class parties systematically provide
governmental elites with stable electoral majorities. However, other times, groups in the
popular sector give their support to parties that are consistently excluded from electoral
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competition or where the electoral system is comprised of multiple parties that struggle to
organize stable majorities. These systems are much more likely to provide incentives for
a populist coalition. This helps to explains why Argentina, Chile, Brazil, and Peru, which
are countries with exclusionary or unstable electoral systems, have been the most prone
to populist political cycles. Finally, political regimes can provide an explanation of the
tendency towards populist policies. The three types of regimes in Latin America are
authoritarian regimes; democratic regimes; and traditional democracies, which take place
when an authoritarian regime begins to change to a democratic regime. An authoritarian
regime is likely to occur in countries with exclusionary or multiparty systems, which
already have populist tendencies. This is compounded with the pent-up economic demand
that transitional democracies often encounter. In new democracies, institutional
uncertainties tend to shorten the time horizons of political parties, moving the focus
towards the short-term policies advocated by the populist support base (Kaufman and
Stallings 19-26).

A RETURN TO POPULISM?
At the end of the Cold War and with the collapse of the Soviet bloc, political and
economic liberalism appeared triumphant throughout the world. The Washington
Consensus, which brought the three cornerstones of electoral democracy, free markets,
and US dominance, was diffused around the world. Labor unions were in decline,
populist and leftist parties were in disarray to the point of being nonexistent, and
neoliberal politicians were in control of policymaking areas (Roberts 2). Even when
leftist and populist candidates ran as leftist candidates, they usually governed as
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premarket conservatives. The debt and inflationary crises the region had experienced in
the 1980s had discredited the state-led model advocated by the left, limited the
governments’ policy options and pushed them towards the free market policies that were
advocated by the US government, the World Bank, and the IMF (Levitsky and Roberts
2). Although the privatization that occurred as part of neoliberalism faced opposition, it
seemed that other neoliberal policies, such as free trade and foreign investment, saw
broad support from the public. In fact, many neoliberal politicians were reelected,
especially when they successfully dealt with hyperinflation in the economy (Roberts 12).
US-style capitalism seemed to be completely dominant in the region.
However, since this balance was sustained and reproduced through democracy, it
was vulnerable to destabilizing forces. Particularly important were financial crises and
the renewal of popular mobilization (Roberts 3). The region experienced marginal growth
between 1990 and 1997; this ended in most Latin American countries in the late 1990s.
Between 1998 and 2002, Latin America experienced negative per capita growth, as well
as increases in both poverty and unemployment. In 2002, 60 percent of families in Latin
America reported an adult member of their household had been unemployed in 2001. The
economic stabilization and economic growth that did occur in the 1990s still failed to
bring citizens out of poverty or solve the issues of inequality and social exclusion. In
2002, 44 percent of the population lived in poverty. The region also had the most unequal
distribution of income in the world, and this inequality only continued to increase in the
1990s (Levitsky and Roberts 3, 7-9). In fact, Jamaica is the only Latin American country
that is not significantly more unequal than would be expected based on its level of
wealth. This left the median voter in most Latin American countries prone to support
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redistribution of wealth (Cleary 37). This was compounded by the fact that rights of
social citizenship established under populism, including employment security, old age
insurance, and collective bargaining rights, were removed under the policies of
neoliberalism, which temporarily undermined the capacity of the poor to organize against
social exclusion (Roberts 3). The withdrawal of much of this social protection was seen
as an abandonment of the people to their own luck, which led to social resentment and
indifference toward political institutions (Gallegos 2). Thus, this created a tension
between democratic citizenship rights and the extreme forms of social inequality found
throughout the region of Latin America, as the global markets severely limited the policy
options of Latin American leaders, diminished democracy, and conflicting with citizens’
expectations that that states defend their national political autonomy (Roberts 4).
The economic crisis facing neoliberalist leaders hurt incumbents across the
region, with 70 percent of survey respondents across Latin America expressing
dissatisfaction with the performance of the market economy, which denoted a sharp
decline in the public support for the Washington Consensus (Levitsky and Roberts 10).
Although there were new opportunities for the left to mobilize in the region, the longterm changes in the global economy from neoliberalism and the recent short-term
economic shocks reduced the feasibility of traditional state interventionist and pro-labor
policies that populism and leftist parties had both often rallied around. This was further
exacerbated by the debt crisis, as international financial institutions restricted the policy
options Latin American countries could choose from. This required the labor-based
parties to take a slightly different approach in order to regain traction, such as increased
acceptance of market liberalization, looser ties to unions, and an appeal to new electoral
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support bases (Burgess and Levitsky 883-884). In Argentina specifically, the Peronist
party underwent a dramatic transformation in which it severed linkages with organized
labor and became more patronage-oriented, a change that allowed the Peronist party to
retain its electoral competitiveness (Etchemendy and Gray 285). This tactical shift,
combined with the environment of Latin America’s recent transitions, made the late
1990s and early 2000s an ideal time for a left and populist resurgence (Cleary 40).
Even so, the unpreceded wave of electoral victories by leftist presidential
candidates in Latin America, beginning with Hugo Chávez’s election in Venezuela in
1988, still shocked the rest of the world (Levitsky and Roberts 1). This new trend brought
new social and economic policies to the region, changing not only who governed in the
area, but also how they governed. Néstor Kirchner was elected president of Argentina in
2003 with the support of the mainstream Peronist machine, but only a slim margin of
victory. Kirchner received only 21.99 percent of the popular vote, as opposed to Carlos
Ménem’s 24.34 percent. This vote required a runoff, but the election was handed to
Kirchner when Ménem pulled out. This left Kirchner with the smallest number of votes
in the history of the country’s elections (Country Profile: Argentina).
Over the next decade, the resurgence of the left only expanded, partly as a result
of the commodities boom in 2002. Just as poor economic growth had hurt the country’s
right-oriented incumbents, soaring export prices worldwide created the highest growth
rate Latin America had seen in decades and, in turn, support for the leftist leaders that
governed during this growth. The commodities boom also allowed parties to actually
govern on the left. In the 1990s, even left-of-center governments in the region reluctantly
adopted more conservative policies in the face of balance-of-payment shortages and
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fiscal constraints. The left now had, however, new resources, and, subsequently, new
policy freedom with a newfound independence from the US and international financial
institutions. The left was able to use these resources to invest in social welfare policies
that the left was known for without facing the foreign exchange crises that had
characterized more populist administrations (Levitsky and Roberts 10-11). In Argentina,
this deepening of the left resurgence manifested itself in the 2007 election. Kirchner’s
wife, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, won the election with 44.94 percent of the vote,
while the second place candidate, Elisa Maria Avelina Carrio, boasted only 22.95 percent
of the vote (Country Profile: Argentina).
The Kirchner administrations fall under the spectrum of populism as a political
movement, but it is distinct from the previous forms of populism that Argentina had seen,
which failed to clearly fit into a place on the classic left-right spectrum. As defined
earlier, populism and the left are not phenomena that necessarily coincide, and they can
often exist in tension which one another. The Kirchner’s form of populism, however, had
an obvious leftist tilt, although their party, the Partido Justicialista (PJ), did not. In this
case, the left refers to political actors who aim to reduce social and economic inequalities
as a primary objective. Leftist parties use public authority to redistribute wealth to lowerincome groups, shake up social hierarchies, and give traditionally disadvantaged groups a
larger voice in the political process (Levitsky and Roberts 5). Historically, most leftist
groups attempted to accomplish the latter goal through violence, revolution, and other
anti-systemic groups, meaning they exhibited a significant break with their past in terms
of strategy. Instead, they competed for elected office, usually by either reorganizing as
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electorally viable political parties or using already established parties with left-of-center
views as allies (Cleary 41).
Gallegos further divides the left that made a comeback in Latin America
beginning in the late 1990s into two different forms. The first is pragmatic, sensible, and
modern, and can be seen in Chile, Brazil, and Uruguay. This form accepts the
predominance of the free market with resignation. The leaders of this type of left have
accepted the political rules currently in play and work to compromise with democratic
institutions with an understanding that politics is a gradual method of changing the
popular agenda. The other type of left is demagogic, nationalistic, and populist, and can
be found in Venezuela, Bolivia, Mexico, and, most notably, Argentina. This idealist form
is not only anti-neoliberal, but also has a tendency to become anti-capitalist and to
advocate the dismantling of the free democracy. Its leaders consider the rule of law and
democracies as formalities that cannot and will not inhibit the expression of the popular
will (Gallegos 1).
Overall, the Kirchners embraced populism by using policies and state
appointments to integrate popular actors, through social movements and labor unions, to
their governing coalition. This worked to their benefit, as these allies became vital
supporters of their government, which came in with a precariously low level of the
electoral votes. Typical of leftist administrations, which challenge business and financial
interests, the Kirchner governments clashed with domestic business on regulatory issues.
Despite the mobilization of low-class actors and these financial challenges, which created
a heightened political polarization, the Kirchner administrations remained completely
democratic. Even so, they maintained a middle ground in terms of left populism at that
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time. They valued economic growth over controlling inflation and developed a good
relationship with the Argentine Industrial Union, the premier national industrial
association. At the same time, however, they were cautious in other areas; for example,
they were unwilling to reverse the major privatizations of the 1990s (Etchemendy and
Gray 284-285).

OVERVIEW OF THE KIRCHNER ADMINISTRATIONS
The Kirchner cycle of 2003 to 2015 is the longest period in Argentine history,
even surpassing both presidencies of Julia Argentina Roca combined. Gerchunoff and
Kacef describe an anecdote of the Kirchner family on May 25, 2003, the day Néstor
Kirchner took office, in which the newly-inaugurated president asks of his family, “What
do we do now?” The policies during the Kirchner administrations were pure present and
pure urgency; in other words, they showed a clear preference for the present and for the
immediate future. This “what do we do now” mentality was a thread that connected the
three periods of the Kirchner administrations: 2003-2008: the rugged ascension towards
political climax, 2008-2011: the response to and recovery from international financial
crisis; and 2011-2015: peak of power and macroeconomic disequilibrium (Gerchunoff
and Kacef 3). This section provides an overview of the Kirchner administrations through
these periods, and Table 1 presents a summary of the macroeconomic, regulatory, labor
and social policy enacted between 2003 and 2015.
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Table 1: Summary of Policies During the Kirchner Administrations

Macroeconomic and Financial Policy
•

Achieved exchange rate depreciation through Central Bank intervention in capital
inflows

•

Exchange rate depreciation favored tradable productive sectors and consolidated
the fiscal front

•

The government refused to agree to specific policies in exchange for new funds
from the IMF and the World Bank, eventually canceling all liabilities

•

Expansion of universal price subsidies and state infrastructure and spending

•

Fiscal surpluses were a result of high commodity prices combined with debt
rescheduling, nationalization of private pension funds, and export taxes

Regulatory Policy
•

Worked to protect the popular sectors’ short-term income through price controls
on public utilities; subsidies to businesses in areas including energy, transport,
and food production; and export taxes and quotas on wage goods and primary
food crops

•

Increased domestic prices resulting from high internal prices and local demand
were regulated by price controls

•

The government controlled the price of public utilities

•

The government used direct monetary infusions to keep prices down

State Ownership
•

Did not push a major expansion of state ownership of production
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•

The major privatizations of the 1990s were not rolled back

•

Nationalization only occurred in cases in which severe conflicts erupted over
price rates and market conditions

Labor Policy
•

Collective wage bargaining was virtually absent, and industrial conflict was
largely suppressed

•

The government was reluctant to restrain strikes, stating that it was the natural
way for workers to recover real wages

•

The government intervened in wage policy by stipulating nominal wage increases
in the private sector and by increasing the minimum wage

•

Creation of new regulation is labor law and health policy for unions

•

Completion of a national round of collective bargaining to negotiate a minimum
wage and a wage-increase parameter

Social Policy
•

Expanded access to social transfers and pensions

•

Created difference employment schemes and extended family allowances to lowincome children

•

Expanded and nationalized the pension system to universalize coverage and
capture pension rents as a source of funding for social policy

•

Passed a large extension of universal family allowances directed to households
outside the formal labor market that included incentives for school attendance and
regular health checkups

Source: Etchemendy and Gray
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THE YEARS LEADING INTO THE KIRCHNER ADMINISTRATION
An unprecedented crisis struck Argentina in 2001, generating changes of
enormous magnitude in income and wealth distribution. Many Argentines had previously
seen the monetary regime of Convertibility as an untouchable economic situation, but the
external financial restriction seemed impossible to overcome, ending in the abandonment
of Convertibility, an unprecedented level of unemployment, and increases in poverty and
real wages (Gerchunoff and Kacef 2004). The government defaulted on its debts, the
peso devaluated by almost 75 percent, unemployment reached 22 percent, and the
banking system collapsed. There was also a profound effect on politics; two presidents
resigned between October 2000 and August 2002. The same period also saw five
different ministers of the economy, as well as five cabinet crises and one Senate crisis.
Table 2: Perceived Economic Stability in Argentina
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This shocked both Argentines and many scholars, given that the 1990s was one of
the most stable periods in the country’s history. Argentina introduced such extensive
market-oriented reforms that the Heritage Foundation ranked the country’s economy
among the “freest” in the world in 1999. A constitutional change made in 1994 alleviated
much of the interparty animosity that had characterized the previous decades, and
Argentina between 1991 and 1998 exhibited peaceful transfers of power and stability on
both the economic and political fronts that was unlike anything seen in the country’s
previous 60 years. Going from this kind of stability to such a severe economic crisis
brought about a volatile political climate, creating candidates that protested the ideals of
the Washington Consensus and the market-oriented reforms implemented in the 1990s
(The Politics of Argentina’s Meltdown 29-30).
Yet, surprisingly, Argentina began to recover in the second half of 2002. The
devaluation of the currency made products inexpensive for individuals who had saved
dollars, promoting internal spending as part of the so-called “wealth effect.” The offer of
exportable goods and services also reacted to the low prices, creating a combination of
both an increase in the supply of tradable goods and services and an increase in the
demand of non-tradable goods and services. This resulted in a spending multiplier effect,
which translated into increased levels of employment and improved wages for workers,
although these elements were coming from historically low levels to begin with
(Gerchunoff and Kacef 5).
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2003-2007: THE RUGGED ASCENSION TOWARDS POLITICAL CLIMAX
Kirchner assumed office in 2003 with limited real power, boasting only 22.24
percent of the votes. His only coalition had been imposed by Eduardo Duhalde before
him, he had a cabinet of only a few departments and secretaries, and only a few
legislators that responded to his authority (Gerchunoff and Kacef 3). Although it was not
reflected in the election, the Argentine people seemed ready for a change. In 2003, 25
percent of Argentines polled stated they had “a lot” of confidence in the president, while
45 percent said they had “some.” This was a stark contrast to the confidence levels just
two years prior, with only five percent and 20 percent in the categories of “a lot” and
“some,” respectively. Additionally, individuals had high hopes for the economy, with 67
percent of the economy in 2003 expecting the economy to be better just two months in
the future. Although this level of confidence in the economy decreased some over time, it
still remained relatively high until Cristina Kirchner took office.
Table 3: Argentine Confidence in the President Over Time
Confidence Level 1997
A lot
6
Some
17
Little
27
None
44
No answer
1
No knowledge
5
Source: Latinobarometro

1998
8
14
27
50
1
1
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19
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5
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1
1
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25
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20
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0
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16
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0
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23
44
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0
0

2007
11
32
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25
0
1

2013
19
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26
27
0
0
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A government like this, with few votes and limited authority, has before it two
choices: to invest its limited capital in a mixture of short- and long-term policies or to
invest only in short-term projects. Although the first option is what is usually considered
to be governance, a government can select the second option if it assigns a high
probability to negative political shock resulting in political default. With the political
default of Duhalde fresh in his mind, and with his chief objective being to try to
reactivate the economy as quickly as possible, Kirchner opted for the choice of investing
solely in the short-term.
Kirchner became president during a time of improving economic conditions, and,
by increasing the minimum wage and minimum retirements, he gave an extra push to
what was already moving. When Argentines were asked to grade how the economy was
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performing, the negative response reached its peak in 2002, with a drastic positive change
seen in 2003.
Table 5: Argentine Perception of Economic Performance
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The Argentine economy was growing 7.7 percent annually during the fall of 2003,
but the annual rate had climbed to 8.8 percent by the end of the calendar year. The
unemployment numbers were significantly lower those the 21.5 percent recorded in 2002,
but about a quarter of the urban population was still living in precarious positions, with
17.8 percent unemployment and 11.8 percent underemployment. This accelerated
creation of employment, however, made for additional taxes for Kirchner’s policy
initiatives (Gerchunoff and Kacef 5). Overall, this period was characterized by a positive
macroeconomic performance, with an average annual gross domestic product (GDP)
growth of nine percent (Gervasoni and Peruzzotti 129).
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In many ways, in terms of policy, Kirchner immediately made decisions that took
advantage of this new setting, which was radically different than that of the previous
year. At the end of 2001, he decided upon the partial suspension of public debt payments
and the abandonment of the “one for one” peg of the peso to the dollar, which had been
in place for just over 10 years. He also established taxes on exports and controls on the
movement of capital. Finally, he cancelled the link to the dollar of many prices and taxes,
which had been instituted in the 1990s along with the privatization of many public
businesses and the relinquishing of many public services to private management. In terms
of social policy, he implemented a plan to mitigate the negative impact of the crisis on
the people of Argentina (Gervasoni and Peruzzotti 116-117).
When he took office, Kirchner already knew that he needed to turn the
reactivation of the economy into political power. The 2003 election saw about 35 percent
of the national vote going to candidates in support of Kirchner, a big step forward from
his starting point a few months early. Yet this was still the worst victory margin since the
rebirth of democracy in Argentina in 1983, forcing him to form an agreement with the
deputies and senators still in support of Eduardo Duhalde’s policies, and to fall back on
one of his campaign promises: to continue the political economic choices of Duhalde.
The most significant of these choices was to keep the executive minister of these policies,
Roberto Lavagna, as a member of his Cabinet. This continuity meant, among other
things, a nominal exchange rate approximately fixed against the dollar, which was made
possible by the depreciation of the dollar towards other currencies and a high real
multilateral exchange rate. This was a source of calm to the members of the middle class
that had been so shaken by the financial crisis of 2001. It also brought financial
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tranquility, which propelled a decrease of the interest rate in the larger context of
declining international rates. This quickly translated into an increase in investment, a
further manifestation of the “wealth effect,” and an accelerator of income, which was
particularly favorable to tradable sectors in production. The positive modernizing
changes made in the productive structure during the 1990s could finally be seen. This
dynamic of financial growth and development was accompanied by popular support for
Kirchner, and the development strain of the Kirchner coalition took root (Gerchunoff and
Kacef 6).
The high exchange rate, which doubled between the end of 2001 and 2003, served
as an effective tool that Kirchner used to establish a surplus in the current account
balance of payments that would allow the Central Bank to use internal reserves to buy
foreign currency, which resulted in a renewed availability of resources to finance public
policy. It also had a very favorable impact on the production sector’s ability to produce
internationally marketable goods (Gervasoni and Peruzzotti 119). Additionally, it was
important in preserving a competitive and stagnant real exchange rate, which was gaining
relevance in macroeconomic policy. The government even made explicit reference to the
importance of preserving a competitive and stable exchange rate in official economic
strategy. The Kirchner administration saw a competitive exchange rate as essential for
incentivizing growth and job creation (Gervasoni and Peruzzotti 131).
Another tool, although somewhat less conventional, that he made use of was the
underestimation of growth for the projections of public income, which allowed for the
appropriation of an excess of collection that could be used outside of the assigned
budgets and increased the margin of tactical movement. In this way, the government
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assured the indispensable complement to its strategy of political expansion: the
availability of funds for its policies. This was the available efficient path to improving the
living conditions of the popular sector, given that Duhalde left Kirchner a legacy that was
hard to follow, and that the economy was just emerging from the deepest part of the
recession. It also provided a way for him to clear the low voter turnout that handed him
the presidency from the minds of the public. Kirchner was in a situation of strong
reactivation after a deep recession that he portrayed as someone else’s fault, which could
only help his image. In fact, he was already on his way to a stronger coalition of support.
Between 2002 and 2004, it was nearly impossible to find a flaw in the economy of
Argentina by looking at the outer layer. The continuity between the Duhalde and
Kirchner regimes, however, was key for success in this case, and it makes sense to
analyze its results together. The annual economic growth rate had fallen to 5.3 percent by
the middle of 1998, when Convertibility had reached its bitter end, but began a means of
productive rebirth resulting in a GDP annual growth rate of 8.6 percent by the conclusion
of the same year. This positive movement continued in other areas as well.
Unemployment fell from 21.5 percent, which was its highest point, to 12.1 percent by
2008. This particularly appealed to the people, as unemployment was seen as one of the
biggest problems the country was facing during this time, as shown by a survey
conducted by Latinobarometro.
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Table 6: Perceived Economic Problems During the Kirchner Administration
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This was accompanied by other improvements in the labor market, including a 27
percent increase in real wages in the formal private sector, following the significant wage
decreases after the devaluation. In terms of indicators of significant macroeconomic
growth, inflation dropped from 30 percent to 4.4 percent over the course of 2008. The
improvement in terms of trade, although moderate, resulted in the doubling of
international reserves and additional taxes generated by exports substantial enough to
generate a fiscal surplus of four percent of GDP, when combined with the higher volumes
of exports coming from Argentina. Finally, low interest rates and the liquidity of
financial markets internationally served as incentives for Argentine bondholders on the
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verge of default to accept longer-term bonds. This created new debt that was larger than
the original level of debt (Gerchunoff and Kacef 6-9).
Although the economy was saved from a crash, it was moving ahead at an
unsettling speed. As mentioned in the previous section, Kirchner responded to the higherthan-average demand for labor with an increase in minimum retirement, as well as the
reactivation of collective work deals a little bit later. The increase in nominal wages
translated into an increase in real wages, but this also meant an increase in labor prices. In
this way, the economy was placed on a track of growing inflation, despite the fact that the
inflation rate was already 12 percent by 2005. With the interests of his political coalition
at the forefront of his mind, Kirchner chose an inflationary method of governance, and
financed this through the purchase of reserves. During this time, the economy
experienced growing real wages in all sectors, unemployed individuals found work or
saw a higher probability in finding it, and industry benefited from the high real exchange
rate and moderate protectionism; Kirchner used these economic circumstances to gain
political terrain. In the intermediate elections of October 2005, Kirchner defeated
Duhalde in his own territory, the province of Buenos Aires, and received 38.3 percent of
the vote at the national level.
Although this was substantial improvement, it did not definitively end the
question of power inside the Peronist party. Through the election, Kirchner ended
Duhalde’s political aspirations, but, in order to ensure that the county’s economic
successes were attributed to him rather than to the continuation of Duhalde’s economic
policies, Kirchner decided to alieve Lavagna of his position in the ministry. Along with
Lavagna’s removal also came the end of a project he had been working on: a fiscal fund
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of stabilization, which would entail saving now for hard times or high inflation in the
future. Yet saving was a luxury that Kirchner still could not see his administration
indulging in, further evidence of his interest in the present rather than the long-term.
Through the end of 2006, there were no major social cracks in Kirchner’s
coalition, but this could only last as long as the inflation rate did not corrode the real
exchange rate, the pillar of Kirchner’s strategy for economic reactivation. The inflation
rate was becoming dangerously significant, but Kirchner’s priority was producing a
major win in the October 2007 presidential election. If he decided to address the inflation
rate, it could not endanger the performance at the polls or the structure of his coalition.
Other Latin American economies allowed for nominal appreciation of the currency to
neutralize the impact of the coalition, and this gave way to the implementation of a
contractive fiscal policy that would neutralize the transmission of increased wealth to
consumption to some degree. This was significant because the expanded consumption
increased the inflation rate to some degree. Kirchner decided not to implement either of
these options, however, and instead took fiscal policy in the opposite direction. He
transferred the collection to the fringes of society with a better marginal propensity to
consume, giving a new push toward growth and assuring the electoral victory in the
upcoming presidential election. The view of inflation in the government was that it was
the result of distributive conflict, and it saw distributive conflict as a natural aspect of the
economic process that needed to be managed, although not through contractive policies
(Gerchunoff and Kacef 9-12). The government’s decision not to fight against inflation
was a turning point in the administration, as inflation was deteriorating competition. Once
Kirchner instead decided to confront the external disequilibrium with trade controls,
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rather than dealing with the inflation rate, it was very difficult to have a rational
administration in terms of trade (Llach).
Somewhere between the beginning of 2006 and the middle of 2008, the external
terms of trade skyrocketed, leading to benefits of around four percent of annual GDP.
This increased the perceived wealth and increased demand. Especially because the
individuals that had a high marginal propensity to consume benefited the most from this
new wealth, the increased demand created an added pressure on the inflation rate.
Furthermore, the prices of exportable goods increased, although the nominal exchange
rate. By the start of 2006, prices had already increased by 20 percent annually. Although
the shock of international prices was favorable, it was linked to the inflationary problem
Kirchner’s policies tended to create (Gerchunoff and Kacef 12-13).

2007-2011: INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL TURBULENCE
Kirchner’s response to the growing inflationary problem was simply to sweep the
problem under the rug, postponing any economic solution. In January 2007, he decided to
understate the true inflation rate in the official statistics. It is likely that is doing so, they
also underestimated the consequences of the problem. Additionally, the inflationary
underestimation left the economy without a key indicator that could be used to construct
a domestic capital market in indexed pesos, but this was not an immediate source of
concern for the government. The primary concern was simply the October election. The
election was nuanced, with persistent accelerated growth, a reduction in unemployment,
and redistributive policies, but also growing inflation, albeit hidden.
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Although Cristina Kirchner won the election in the first round with much more
comfort than her husband, many attribute this less to her own merits and more to the
fragmentation of the opposition. In terms of overall percentage, Cristina Kirchner won
with the poorest vote percentage of any Peronist candidate since 1946 and of any
candidate, independent of party, since 1983, with the exception, of course, of her own
husband. Kirchner was leaving office, however, with a more or less positive perception,
one that his wife hoped to build on.
Table 7: Popularity of Néstor Kirchner on a 1-10 Scale
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This victory gave way to a worry on the macroeconomic front: adjustment was
necessary to contain inflation. Following the expansionary policies leading up to the 2007
campaign, Cristina Kirchner decided to take a sort of break, with a decrease in public
spending that had been increasing so significantly in previous years. Instead, the
government increased retentions, which had the immediate effect of directly cutting
costs, while also being less costly politically.
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In Argentina, there was no historic precedent in agricultural rebellions against an
increase in taxes on exporting. When Néstor Kirchner took the first step toward
increasing an export tax, there was no reaction, but there was a much different reaction
with Cristina Kirchner took a second step in this direction through a system of mobile
retentions that placed a strong pressure on the farming sector. Their open resistance led
not only to the Kirhners’ first defeat in the area of street mobilizations, but also a
significant parliamentary defeat in June 2009. Yet the biggest defeat was that the
coalition of support lost both the farming sector and, at least for some time, the middle
classes as well. The government had arguably become victim to an ancient problem in the
country: the profit of revalued natural resources was seen by citizens as private, meaning
that transferring part of this profit to the State created some degree of conflict. Other
countries, such as Chile, Bolivia, Mexico, and Venezuela, all mining and petroleumcentered, were starkly different in that natural resources were largely considered State
property.
Almost simultaneously, Cristina Kirchner was confronted with external turmoil in
the form of a brief, yet intense, worldwide recession lasting approximately from spring of
2008 to winter of 2009. Countries around the world reacted to the economic contraction
and the unemployment increase with more protectionist policies, causing international
trade to contract as well (Gerchunoff and Kacef 12). The crisis had two primary effects
worldwide in terms of trade. The first was a clear fall in the level of activity, translated
most notably through a decrease in imports. The second was a change in trade policies.
The Global Monitoring Report of May 2009 noted many countries implementing trade
policies against the crisis, including the United States, England, France, Germany, Italy,
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Russia, Canada, China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, and countries in the Mercosur. This
dramatically reduced trade throughout the world, as each country that cut off additional
problems created a sense of autarky throughout the world. In fact, according to the World
Bank, 85 percent of trade policies proposed between the start of the crisis and February
2009 has a restrictive character. Only a third of these policies consisted of an increase of
tariffs, leaving the majority to be non-traditional measures (Kosacoff and Mercado 36).
When the crisis hit, however, Argentina was in a relatively stable position to
absorb the economic crisis, which was transmitted between nations mainly through trade
flows and financial flows. Argentina approached the crisis with a substantial store of
reserves, an important excess in the current account, and a financial surplus in public
accounts (Gervasoni and Peruzzotti 137). Still, in terms of trade, Argentina was a price
taker and depended greatly on the other countries in the Mercosur, especially for
industrial goods. Because of these two structural aspects, Argentina still had significant
exposure to commercial shocks in the form of variations in the terms of trade and in
import demand from other countries in the Mercosur (Kosacoff and Mercado 43).
Despite the relatively solid position, Argentina showed signs of being hit heavily
by an international crisis, specifically through financial isolation in the public sector
(Gervasoni and Peruzzotti 138). Exports decreased by 20 percent and imports by 32
percent in 2009. As a consequence of the growing fear the recession inserted into society,
consumption and investment fell. The good news, however, was that inflation decreased
by more the half, allowing real wages to increase and placing inflation on the route to a
recession spiral. The government had an opportunity for anti-cyclical policy similar to
that which was being unfolded in other Latin American countries. This anti-cyclical
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policy did create a moderate increase in public spending, but, since it was limited by the
unavailability of capital markets and the scarcity of funds, this expansive impulse was
much less significant than what was seen in neighboring countries. Without access to
financial markets, and with the default of 2002 still in mind, the government opted for
more economically prudent policy, but they coupled this with political audacity in the
form of an attempt to nationalize the pension funds that Ménem had privatized during his
administration (Gerchunoff and Kacef 13-18).
In a test of her performance in the recession, the intermediate legislative elections
of 2009, Kirchner-supporting candidates failed to receive even 30 percent of the vote, the
worst Peronist election in democratic times. The defeat naturally carried with it a loss of
support in all social sectors. The government needed to respond quickly, and did so with
the November 2009 decree that put the Asignación Universal por Hijo, a policy of
conditional transference similar to that of Mexico and Brazil, into action, in hopes of
regaining votes. The government’s priority was reconstructing its majority coalition, and
the future lost its value in comparison to a focus on the short-term. The short-distance
race had already begun, and Cristina Kirchner was looking at tools from fiscal
expansionism to exchange appreciation to reach the end goal of electoral validation.
The brief international financial crisis had left in its wake an extraordinarily low
interest rates internationally and a depreciated dollar, creating an upward trajectory in the
price of primary goods, much to the benefit of Argentina and other countries that had
similar productive structures. The year 2010 saw growth of 9.6 percent according to
official statistics, or about 8.2 percent according to private estimates. This dynamic was
maintained in 2011, but this was not sufficient with the October presidential election in
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view. Cristina Kirchner’s government adopted the policy of depreciated the currency to
hopefully create a lower level of inflation, as well as put into action an additional policy
that her husband had already experimented with: the freezing of domiciliary taxes on the
public services of transport, specifically in the populated metropolitan area. Not only was
this an electorally appealing move, but she knew she could also maintain stable inflation.
This tax delay affected investments in infrastructure, and the government promoted the
idea that consumption takes precedence over saving and investment. This electoral
strategy still needed, however, strongly expansive fiscal policy. The public spending of
the national administration, in terms of GDP, was higher in 2011 than any other year in
the history of Argentina. Additionally, the financial result was negative during 2011 for
the first time since 2003, and this was financed by the Central Bank (Gerchunoff and
Kacef 18-21).

2011-2015: PEAK OF POWER AND MACROECONOMIC DISEQUILIBRIUM
As Argentina approached the impending election of October 2011, there were
problems, but there were also successes: economic growth, high salaries, cheap tariffs,
exchange rate appreciation, expansion of public spending, fiscal deficit, and the financing
of this deficit through the Central Bank. With an environment reminiscent of the first
Peronism, but still in a moderately open economy, Cristina Kirchner achieved 54 percent
of the vote in the October. Although this undebatable electoral triumph that earned a spot
in the range of traditional Peronists could have buried the “what do we now” mentality
that had originated in a moment of political weakness, this victory was obtained in the
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middle of a macroeconomic disequilibrium and a time of new political economic
problems for the country.
In order to address the negative current account balance of payments, the low
levels of foreign direct investment, and the falling reserves of the Central Bank, the
government faced for options: monetary policy, which would increase the interest rate; a
depreciation of the currency; a combination of monetary policy and currency
depreciation; and control of the exchange terms. Through vehemently ruling out all other
options, Cristina Kirchner chose control of exchange and a generalized system of import
approvals through the process of elimination. With this move, Kirchnerism now aligned
closely with classic Peronism. In the times of Perón, the quantitative import restrictions
could keep away a process of import substitutions in consumer goods, but, in the
beginning of the 21st century, importing less meant producing less. In other words, the
government underestimated the economic efficiency of a policy of exchange control,
leading to economic stagnation and a reduction in the electoral base (Gerchunoff and
Kacef 22-26).
With a loss in the legislative elections of October 2013, Cristina Kirchner
resigned to working politically to define the presidential successor and economically to
eliminate the risk of financial crisis. If she was successful in the second endeavor, the
likelihood of being able to impose her own candidate in the presidential elections of 2015
increased substantially. In January 2014, the currency was devaluated and inflation was
increasing, and the beneficial increase in prices came to an end as interest rates stopped
increasing. The opposing candidate won by a small margin in a second electoral round,
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putting an end to the period of Kirchnerism in Argentine economic and political history
(Gerchunoff and Kacef 27-28).
Overall, the period of the Kirchner administrations follows the four stages of a
populist administration established by Dornbusch and Edwards. When Néstor Kirchner
took office, he was justified in his policies, and the economy experienced high rates of
growth. With an increase in domestic demand and a growing lack of foreign exchange,
however, the economy moves into the period of economic bottlenecks. The situation
reached desperation as Cristina Kirchner took office, and faced problems such as a large
expansion of inflation and a foreign exchange gap. Just as predicted in the populist
model, many policies were unstable during this period. This ended with stabilization
through the transition of the administration from Cristina Kirchner to the new president,
Mauricio Macri.

STRATEGIC TRADE POLICY AND POPULISM
It is important to study trade policy, as trade openness can result in measurable
economic growth, a higher standard of living, more innovation, and stronger institutions
and infrastructure. It can also lead to more jobs, even in a situation of high
unemployment, and higher real wages. According to the World Bank, open economies
grow faster than closed economies, with per capita real income growing more than three
times faster for developing countries that lowered trade barriers than other developing
countries in the 1990s, with increases of five percent and 1.4 percent per year. Trade and
GDP have grown together in region that have embraced outward-oriented development
strategies, such as East Asia and the Pacific (Why Open Markets Matter). On the other
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hand, protectionism makes domestic firms less competitive in the export market, as
import barriers raise domestic prices, creating a subsequent rise in export products and a
loss in market in market share in the face of international competition. Furthermore, each
dollar of increased protection leads to drop of 66 cents in GDP (Protectionism — The
Case Against).
The typical economist definition links populism with ISI, import restrictions, and
weak trade participation, all of which were seen during the Kirchner administration. ISI is
an inward-looking strategy for development designed to promote domestic production of
labor-intensive manufactured goods that the country formerly imported. Governing
planning and controls can be used to allocate scarce resources only to the industries
targeted for development. Early ISI scholars advocated following the policy only as long
as necessary to overcome structural obstacles to development (Maxfield and Nolt 50). ISI
is a key component of an economic philosophy that argues the most significant engine of
growth in a country is domestic demand, despite examples of times in history in which
the domestic market has been exploited by monopolies and domestic producers, leading
the country to become less and less productive, and of times when international
competition proved to be beneficial to countries (Sustaining Trade Reform 74).
ISI was Argentina’s primary development strategy following the sharp restriction
in foreign market access with the world crisis of 1929. It was not until the end of 1980s
that the country transitioned to a policy of economic openness, deregulation, and
privatization, marking the end of ISI. The strategy did generate moderate growth until the
mid-190s, but it also created short-term macroeconomic volatility. The production
structure was split into two sectors, an export-oriented agricultural sector and an
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industrial sector designated to produce for the domestic market. The government used
nominal exchange rate and nominal wage as policy tools to achieve balance both
internally and externally. The increase in nominal wages had an expansive effect on
GDP, while the wage increase negatively affected the balance of trade, as a result of the
increase in the imports of intermediate inputs and a decrease in the exportable surplus
(Mercado 151-152).
Industrial policy in developing countries was ubiquitous, but the same level of
success was not seen everywhere. For less developed countries, the boom of the 2000s
saw high growth across the developing countries, and particularly in countries pursuing
heterodox developmental strategies (Haggard 58). The developmental state seen in East
Asia was not built on pure neoliberalism or open trade, but rather export-led growth with
the simultaneous restriction of imports and foreign direct investment. In the face of
external shocks, larger developing countries, especially those with a strong base in
natural resources, were able to continue financing ISI, despite the constraints it placed on
manufacturing exports. These countries were more likely to deepen their ISI structure
than were smaller countries pursuing ISI that both lacked natural resources and faced less
promising domestic market opportunities. In East Asia, the external shocks created a
search for new sources of foreign exchange in exports, foreign investment, and
borrowing. These foreign exchange and resource constraints were actually crucial in
creating institutional developments that resulted in enhanced efficiency. The longer
periods of ISI that Latin America experienced also had the effect of entrenching unequal
social entitlements to the economic structure. Business interests were dependent on
protectionism, which only entrenched the strategy even more. On the other hand, East
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Asian growth was much more inclusive and based on an implicit social contract (Haggard
55).
In contrast, Argentina has increased its export barriers to a degree and scope that
has probably not been matched by any other country, and this was followed by import
barriers triggered by the international recession (Sustaining Trade Reform 72). The
difference between Argentina’s trade policies and those of other countries is dominantly a
matter of choice, rather than a factor determined by geography, resource, or economic
parameters. Argentina’s development strategy sees international trade as merely an
avenue for the transmission of global crisis, and politicians in the country have framed
trade as a vehicle for exploitation and dependency, rather than as an opportunity for
advancement (Trade Reform and Institution Building 608-609).
Additionally, countries worldwide have had to deal with the changing character of
trade and developing definitions of what determines strategic trade policy. Traditional
theories of trade viewed trade mostly as a mechanism for countries to benefit from their
differences in their own comparative advantages in producing goods based on their
differences in climate, culture, skills, resources, and more. This theory resulted in the
conclusion that trade is dominated by exchanges that reflect the strengths of each
individual economy. Although it is still true that the characteristics of a country shape its
trade pattern, a large portion of world trade since World War II has come to consist of
exchanges that are not as clearly tied to the comparative advantage of countries; instead,
trade increasingly seems to rely on arbitrary or temporary advantages (Krugman 7).
Argentina has been a relatively closed economy for the past eight decades, except
for a short period of neoliberalism according to Washington Consensus principles in the
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1990s. Throughout this period, Argentina’s economy has performed poorly in
comparison with countries with similar resource endowments that have adopted open
policies. For example, Argentina’s per capita income in 1930 was 85 percent of
Australia’s, but it was only 30 percent of per capita income by 2003 (Trade Reform and
Institution Building 592-593). During the 21st century, Argentina has put in place more
trade restrictions than any other country. With only a small percentage of those having
been put in place through formal trade defense procedures, trade control has become a
part of the informal sector of government. The below table shows that Argentina has
introduced more import restrictions than have most other countries, as well as that the
share of discretionary measures is high.
Table 8: Restrictive Import Control Actions (2008-2013)
Non-tariff
measures
15
1

Argentina
United States
European
Communities
1
China
7
Brazil
0
Peru
0
Ecuador
2
Colombia
1
Venezuela
2
Chile
0
Source: Global Trade Alert

Technical
Tariff measures
Trade
and sanitary plus import quotas defense
measures
and import bans measures
2
123
44
1
8
134
0
1
0
0
0
2
0
0

10
15
41
0
10
10
6
0

44

71
45
78
14
1
11
0
5

All import
control
measures
184
144
82
68
119
14
13
24
8
5

TRADE POLICY OVER TIME IN ARGENTINA
1949-1958: THE PERONIST PARADISE AND THE DEVELOPMENT CRISIS
In 1949, Argentina exported $933 million in goods, a drastic change compared to
the $1,600 million of the previous year. This meant a reduction in available currency, and
this was combined with an increase in the prices of goods that Argentina needed from
other countries to place even more pressure on already restricted imports. The country
was reaching a point in which it was impossible to contain imports without altering local
industrial production, which imported many of its parts. The government needed to be
more selective in the assignment of currencies and was gradually enforcing the system of
permission for trade that regulated imports and completely prohibited some types of
imports. The country also had to return to quantitative import restrictions, which had
been abolished in the past.
Table 9: Argentine Commercial Deficit
Year

External Terms of Trade
(1960=100)

Exports

Imports

1955

96.9

928.6

1,172.6

1956

87.0

943.0

1,127.6

1957

83.9

974.8

1,210.4

1958

85.1

993.9

1,232.6

Source: Gerchunoff and Llach
Industry, far from being the most dynamic sector in the first years following the
world crisis, suffered with the intensification of these controls. Industrial companies
struggled through difficulties in importing machines and primary goods and revealed the
weakness of the foundations of industrialization in Peronist thought (Gerchunoff and
Llach 205-206).
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Table 10: Imports Over Time
Period

Imports as Percent of GDP

1925-29

24.8

1935-39

14.8

1945-49

9.8

1950-54
Source: Gerchunoff and Llach

7.3

1958-1963: THE DEVELOPMENT IMPULSE
The substitution of imports policy of the previous period continues in this fiveyear period, and was particularly notable in the automobile industry. The trace of an antiexport trend that could be seen did not come from the government of the time, but the
developmental agenda of the administration certainly did not do anything to change the
situation. In fact, a pessimism with respect to the possibilities of international trade was a
primary theme of the development effort. Just as in the previous period, the Argentine
economy was suffering desperately from a lack of currency, and there was no policy in
place to prevent this from reaching a critical point. The country seemed incapable of
simultaneously combining increases in activity level with an equilibrium in external
payments. Each time the economy started to expand, imports of inputs increased, creating
with it a rise in the balance of payments crisis (Gerchunoff and Llach 273-274).

1964-1973: AN ECONOMIC SPRING
The political change that brought about the next administration also brought with
it a long-awaited growth in exports, following the stagnation in exports between the
46

1920s and the first years of the 1960s. Argentina was the only country in the world that
exported less, in terms of dollars, in 1961 than in 1928. Before the fall that Perón created,
the country tried various methods of stimulating production in the agricultural sector,
mostly through price incentives and the encouragement of better technology. But it was
also luck that helped with this increase in exports, with prices of Argentine exports
comparatively high in 1964 and 1965. Additionally, Argentina could export more simply
because they produced more. The external conditions and the respective response of
producers combined to create a level of production that was much higher than the
historical average (Gerchunoff and Llach 297-299).

1973-1983: ECONOMIC VERTIGO IN VIOLENT TIMES
This age saw the return of Perón, but many of his policies stayed the same as
during his last time in office. One substantive difference, however, was that this time
Perón continued the emphasis that had been placed on industrial exports. In contrast, the
industrialization of Peronism in the 1940s and 50s had mostly been rooted in the internal
market. Yet at the end of the 1960s, countries including Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, and
Mexico began to adopt policies to promote industrialization and the subsequent export of
the industrial goods produced. In this countries, manufactured goods grew to be a fifth of
exports, although the number was even higher in Brazil. Perón contributed to this
movement with the “law of protection of jobs and national production.” While it was
extremely protectionist in both name and content, it introduced a series of incentives for
the sale of industrial goods determined by the possibilities of each activity. He also
announced generous credit and technical support for small and medium business,
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investing in their export potential. This is an example of one of the many times Peronism
changed its strategy in regards to aggregate demand. The year 1973 ended with a trade
surplus of US $1,030 million, a historical record and a result of the favorable terms of
trade. These increases prices for Argentine exports continued, and created high terms of
trade for the period (Gerchunoff and Llach 339-340).
In the years following Perón’s second administration, the opening of the economy
to international trade was the second most important task in terms of economic efforts,
second only to the fight against inflation. The years following this period, the country’s
participation in trade had been falling steadily, as seen in the statistics of exports and
imports expressed as a proportion of GDP. This administration, however, brought about
an avalanche of imports, rather than focusing on the other side of the trade balance. In
fact, traditional exports were retracted substantially (Gerchunoff and Llach 369). It is
unclear how much this import growth depended on the opening of the economy and how
much it depended on the retraction of the favorable terms of trade (Gerchunoff and Llach
372).

1983-1989: DEMOCRACY AND THE STRUGGLE TO GOVERN THE ECONOMY
During this period, Argentina found itself facing an external debt crisis. The
creation of large surpluses required the combined action of an increase in exports and a
reduction in imports. There has been a certain margin to squeeze purchases from the
exterior, but eventually this arrived at a critical point that weakened the level of activity.
The exports side of the spectrum was less painful, but weak demands and low prices led
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to a decrease in exports of 20 percent. This was compounded by a 40 percent decrease of
imports between 1981 and 1983 (Gerchunoff and Llach 387).

1989-2001: GREAT EXPECTATIONS, GREAT DECEPTIONS (1989-2001)
This period in economic history was distinguished less by the intensification of
economic ties between countries already open to international influences because of
previous decades and more by the speed of incorporation of new entrants to the
international economic circuit. The reasoning that encouraged governments to adopt
policies that facilitated globalization, in terms of integration into capital and goods
markets, was that open economies enjoyed trade expansion and the attraction of more
profitable investment (Gerchunoff and Llach 427-428).
At the end of the year 1990, the quantitative restrictions on imports in Argentina
had been practically eliminated. If the final objective of the opening was to integrate the
countries into world trade, the results were satisfactory. In 1999, the total value of trade
was triple that of the value in the second half of the 1980s. Throughout this period, the
participation of Argentina in world exports increased significantly (Gerchunoff and Llach
440). Following the years of relative stagnation and starting with a low base, exports and
imports grew by 670 percent respectively between 1990 and 1998. Import demand grew
fast, as the country had remained closed and underinvested for decades, and the resulting
trade and current account deficits were financed with capital inflows such as foreign
direct investment. Additionally, world markets for Argentine products were favorable,
with exports from the country increasing by 11 percent between 2001 and 2011
(Sustaining Trade Reform 77-78).
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Table 11: Trade and Terms of Trade in Argentina, 1990-2010
Current
Imports
Exports
Trade Balance
Account
Year (US$ millions) (US$ millions) (US$ millions) (US$ millions)
1990
4,077.00
12,353.00
8,276.00
1991
8,275.00
11,978.00
3,703.00
1992
14,872.00
12,235.00
(2,637.00)
(5,558.00)
1993
16,784.00
13,118.00
(3,666.00)
(8,209.00)
1994
20,077.00
15,839.00
(4,238.00)
(10,981.00)
1995
20,122.00
20,963.00
841.00
(5,104.00)
1996
23,762.00
23,811.00
49.00
(6,755.00)
1997
30,450.00
26,431.00
(4,019.00)
(12,116.00)
1998
31,377.00
26,434.00
(4,943.00)
(14,465.00)
1999
25,508.00
23,309.00
(2,199.00)
(11,910.00)
2000
25,280.00
26,341.00
1,061.00
(8,955.00)
2001
20,321.00
26,543.00
6,222.00
(3,780.00)
2002
8,990.00
25,651.00
16,661.00
8,767.00
2003
13,833.00
29,939.00
16,106.00
8,140.00
2004
22,445.00
34,576.00
12,131.00
3,212.00
2005
28,687.00
40,387.00
11,700.00
5,274.00
2006
34,151.00
46,546.00
12,395.00
7,768.00
2007
44,707.00
55,980.00
11,273.00
7,354.00
2008
57,422.00
70,019.00
12,597.00
6,755.00
2009
38,760.00
55,672.00
16,912.00
11,062.00
2010
57,462.00
68,134.00
10,672.00
3,081.00
Source: National Institute of Statistics and Censuses

Terms of
trade index
(1990=100)
100
101
108
111
112
112
121
120
113
107
118
117
116
127
129
126
134
140
156
156
156

The behavior of exports and imports, however, moved in opposite directions. The
purchases from the exterior moved in the same direction of the economy, reflecting the
reactivation seen in the first years of Convertibility and the opening of the economy. This
increase in exports did not mean an increase in specialization of the market, and
involvement in manufacturing exports was key. The Mercosur was the primary recipient
of industrial exports of the country. Despite this growth, the decade ended with export
stagnation, which could likely be explained by a recession in Brazil and external factors
that decreased the competitiveness of the Argentine economy (Gerchunoff and Llach
441).
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TRADE IN THE KIRCHNER ADMINISTRATION
When Kirchner took office, the circumstances of international trade were
changing. The trade policy seen in 2001 is distinct from the trade policy seen during the
Kirchner administration, but it also reflected the changing external situation. The policies
had to react to challenges such as the financial crisis in the United State that spread
worldwide and the growth of China in international markets (Kohn). In some ways, these
changes were positive, such as high prices for exports and a high demand for
commodities created by quickly emerging economies that were mostly new on the
international stage. The devaluation of the peso that was started with the recession at the
end of the 1990s deepened the need for a correction in the external imbalance. In the
1990s and in early decades, economic expansions tended to be accompanied by a
progressive deterioration in the trade balance, given that imports had a tendency to grow
much more rapidly than sales to other countries. After the expansion began in 2002,
however, there was a movement in the opposite direction, with high growth rates in GDP
and a consistent surplus in the current account (Gervasoni and Peruzzotti 120-122).
Kirchner implemented a return to import substitution upon taking office, reverting
to instruments of trade control and displacing regulations implemented by Ménem in the
1990s. Cristina Kirchner especially used widespread import controls, which required
approval from the government for each request for the purchase of foreign exchange.
Under this policy, a crucial requirement for importing was export-balancing. This falls
under much of the same rhetoric as used in the previous decades, including the protection
of domestic employment and the need to deal with unfair foreign competition,
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particularly in regards to imports from Asia (Trade Reform and Institution Building 593594).
The import restrictions took many forms, including delays in release from
customs without an explanation, additional documentation requirements, nonresponses
and delayed responses to import license requests, lack of transparency in the decisionmaking process, and volatility and inconsistency in the application of standards. The
element that appeared common throughout the actions, however, was the eventual release
of imports being dependent on reaching an agreement with the government on
commitments to countertrade, to substituting in the future domestic products for
previously imported products, and sometimes even to invest in domestic facilities.
This was accompanied by widespread export taxes, which peaked around 2008, as
part of Cristina Kirchner’s administration. The taxes began in 2006 in the form of
quantitative restrictions, primarily in the agricultural sector of the economy. These taxes
were intended to encourage processing at home, and, just like the import restrictions,
were largely implemented through informal means (Trade Reform and Institution
Building 601-602).
Another difference in trade policy was that interactions with other countries
changed. In the 1990s, Brazil was the recipient of more than 30 percent of Argentina’s
exports. The Kirchners’ trade policies increased the number of exports going to Asian
countries, such as China, but simultaneously decreased the exports going to Brazil,
meaning that a decade later only about 20 percent of exports were going to the
neighboring country. This was in part because of a recession in Brazil, but this cannot
explain entirely the huge change (Kohn).
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For some time, the good price of commodities allowed the Kirchners to combine
relatively protectionist policies with economic growth. Despite not having any pro-trade
policies, the surge in trade dollars was able to finance the imports that the country
needed. Once this deteriorated, because of poor international prices and the overvaluation
of trade, the weaknesses of this strategy could be seen, according to an interview with
Lucas Llach (Llach). This was where the root of the problems with the policy came from:
the lack of currency available to import what the country needed. This turning point was
seen in 2007, with the employment of adjustments and with the extremely high inflation
rates that the country was experiencing. As David Kohn mentioned in his interview, the
focus was on protecting imports, but the economy ran into challenges due to a lack of any
emphasis on supporting exports (Kohn).
The Heritage Foundation ranks trade freedom over time as a composite measure
of the absence of tariff and non-tariff barriers that affect the exports and imports of goods
and services. The level of trade freedom peaks during the second half of the Kirchner
administration, despite strong decreases in the level of trade freedom immediately before
Néstor Kirchner took office and during his administration. Despite this peak, the country
has seen a slow decrease in that freedom since that peak. The trade freedom score is
measured based on the trade-weighted average tariff rate and non-tariff barriers (Heritage
Foundation).
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Table 12: Trade Freedom Percentage for Argentina (1995-2017)
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Source: Heritage Foundation
As of 2017, Argentina is ranked number 156 for most economically free nations,
a score that includes trade freedom. The country’s total score is 50.4, putting it in the
category of “mostly unfree,” just slightly above countries with a score of 40-49.9, which
are listed as “repressed.” Chile ranks at number 10, with the highest score in Latin
America. Bolivia and Venezuela are the only countries in Latin America that, according
to the ranking, are more repressive economically than Argentina (Heritage Foundation).
In terms of trade specifically, Argentina is more repressive than any other country in
Latin America, except for a brief period at the turn of the 21st century, during which
Brazil is even more repressive, and the most recent years, during which Argentina and
Brazil are very equally matched in terms of trade freedom.

54

Table 13: Trade Freedom Percentages for Latin America (1995-2017)
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ANALYSIS THROUGH TRADE DATA
Coming into the 20th century, Argentina was ranked in the top ten countries in the
world in terms of income per capita and shares of world exports, at numbers similar to
those of Australia. Both countries were in a position to take advantage of the
globalization of the world economy that took place around the turn of the century, with
characteristics such as grasslands apt for the development of rural development, low
density of population for the generation of surplus goods for export, and immigrants from
Europe. During the first half of the 20th century, the share of Argentina’s of world exports
was more than three percent, but this had shrunk to less than 0.5 percent by the 1980s.
This export percentage remained stagnant until recent years, while high growth volatility
created a growing gap between Argentina and its peers, many of which continued
growing at a stable rate (Anós-Casero and Rollo 1).
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Table 14: GDP Per Capita Growth in Argentina and Australia
30,000
25,000
20,000
15,000
10,000
5,000

1950
1952
1954
1956
1958
1960
1962
1964
1966
1968
1970
1972
1974
1976
1978
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010

0

Australia

Argentina

Source: Maddison Project
Argentina is a country that is richly endowed in natural resources, and although
agriculture and agro-industries only account for about 10 percent of the country’s GDP,
they have traditionally been the main contributors to export growth. Agricultural profit
margins were particularly strong during the devaluation of the peso in 2002 (Anós-Casero
and Rollo 2).
Table 15: GDP Composition in Argentina Over Time
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Argentina has seen an impressive growth in exports since 2003, when Kirchner
took office. The 2002 currency devaluation had an important role in boosting exports and
strengthening the trade balance, after nearly a decade of trade deficit. The growth in
export volumes had provided a significant trade surplus, a recovery attributable largely to
the excellent terms of trade created the by the peso’s undervaluation and the rise in
commodity prices of Argentina’s primary exports. Yet, despite this increase in export
values, Argentina’s share of world exports has stayed firm at about 0.4 percent in the
period between 2002 and 2007. The export growth was initially led by export quantity,
but this flipped to price-led growth in the 2006-2007 period. A notable characteristic of
export development in Argentina from 2005 to 2008 was the dynamic performance of
service exports, with picked up growth after an initial slowdown in the years immediately
following the crisis.
The economic recovery following the 2001 crisis also led to an increase in
imports, even overcoming a weak exchange rate. The value of Argentina’s imports
reached $46.6 billion during 2007, which was 45.6 percent higher than 2006. This was
followed by a subsequent decline associated with local firms moving from imports to
local equivalents due to the combination of the devaluation of the peso and the import
substitution strategy. Imports were composed of manufactured products, particularly in
the automobile sector, throughout the entire period, meaning imports were highly
technology-intensive and the structure of imports had not changed significantly (AnósCasero and Rollo 3-9).
Between 1960 and 1980, trade as percent of GDP remained relatively stable, at
around 15 percent of GDP. This grew steadily to just under 25 percent by the year 2002,
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and it saw a dramatic increase of about 20 percent during just two years. Between 2004
and 2007, during the rest of Kirchner’s administration, it remained right around 40
percent. Following Cristina Kirchner’s assumption of the office, however, the trade
openness level plummeted, reverting to 2002 levels (World Development Indicators).
Table 16: Trade Openness in Argentina
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We can also examine Argentina’s emphasis on trade policy by examining exports
and imports as percent of GDP separately. While they largely remain closer together,
imports do not see the drastic rise that exports experience in the first Kirchner presidency.
They increase only slightly, but experience a noticeable drop immediately after Cristina
Kirchner took office, and then continue a steady decline throughout her time in office.
While exports increased sharply between 2002 and 2004 just as trade openness did, they
continue a steady decline, eventually stooping to the level of imports, throughout the rest
of the Kirchner administration (World Development Indicators). Looking at the export
share in GDP shows how exposed an economy is to international economy, how easily it
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an exploit economies of scale, and how well it can overcome recessions in the domestic
market (Amsden 163).
Table 17: Exports and Imports as Percent of GDP in Argentina
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Source: World Bank
Comparing this to other countries in the region, Brazil is the country that mirrors
the pattern seen in Argentina most closely. Most countries, especially Uruguay, as well as
Chile to a certain extent, experienced a noticeable increase in trade following the crisis of
2001. Those countries saw a tapering off of trade as well, although Uruguay did not
completely return to pre-crisis levels. Brazil and Argentina were the most closed
countries in the region, with levels of openness lower than the average in Latin America
and the Caribbean. Chile was the most open to trade in the region, and trade was a
significantly higher percentage of their GDP than in Argentina and Brazil (World
Development Indicators). Some scholars believe, however, that if Argentina had instead
adopted policies similar to those of other Latin American countries, including Chile,
Peru, Bolivia, and Colombia, that the country would have experienced higher levels of
growth, as well as more stable growth with less conflict (Llach).
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Table 18: Trade Openness in Latin American Countries
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Latin America as a region was one of the most closed regions in the world. Only
North America was more closed off to trade, although this was logical based on the small
number of countries in the region and the large size of the countries, which provided a
large internal market that many other regions did not have. From the 1970s to present-day
regions throughout the world retained largely the same levels of trade openness, with
only a slight upward trend. East Asia and the Pacific saw the largest growth in trade,
while Latin American was unsuccessful in any efforts to increase its importance in the
worldwide market (World Development Indicators).
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Table 19: Trade Openness by Region
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Looking at exports specifically, the participation of Latin America has been
deteriorating almost permanently in the last 50 years, with almost 10 percent of world
trade in the 1950s but only 4.6 percent in the 1990s. This performance is a notable
contrast from that of Asia, whose participation almost doubled in the same period of time
(Kosacoff et al 28).
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Table 20: Export Participation by Region (in percentages)
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Surprisingly, the level of a country’s income has not been a particularly reliable
indicator of its openness to trade, especially in recent decades. Although higher income
countries traded the most from the 1970s to the 1990, this mostly evened out by the early
1990s. Income has become slightly more important again, even though it still does not
seem to play a huge role in determining trade. Upper middle income and middle income
countries have the lowest levels of trade openness, and Argentina falls into the category
of upper middle income. All countries, regardless of income, have seen a significant
increase in trade as a percentage of their GDP between 1970 and 1940, although all did
see a slight decrease around 2007 and 2008.
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Table 21: Trade Openness by Income Level
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CONCLUSIONS
Although the trade policies of the Kirchners were very distinct from those of
Ménem, the protectionist approach that both Kirchners had was not unique in the history
of Argentina. Instead, it largely mirrored the protectionist tendencies of other popular
administrations in the country’s history, as noted in an interview with Pablo Gerchunoff
(Gerchunoff) In fact, it was the period of the 1990s, which brought a political shift to
greater openness, that is the standout period in the country’s history. This shift was a
result of the insufficiencies and inflation, as well as the declining return of the policies
that had previously been in place. The people of Argentina finally voted for change,
marking a standout point in the country’s history.
Yet with the crisis of 2001 to 2002 that created disillusionment with the
neoliberal-type policies of the 1990s and the return of good times internationally that
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brought a more positive outlook to Argentina’s economy, people’s preferences shifted
back to their traditional perspective on trade. In fact, when Cristina Kirchner was
reelected in 2011 with 54 percent of the vote, with her party winning the majority in both
houses of Congress, the openness, or lack thereof, of the economy was not an issue in the
election. The one candidate who openly supported eliminating export barriers received
less than two percent of the vote, and the election turned into an endorsement of the
restrictions and other trade policies the Kirchners had implemented throughout the past
decade (Sustaining Trade Reform 110).
As shown by the analysis of the trade data, Argentina never exported, and a
closed economy can be seen throughout the country’s history. This is seen in the
Kirchner era, but it was no worse than the trade policy of previous administrations. While
there are fluctuations seen in the level of trade openness, the analysis of trade policy over
time shows that these fluctuations are correlated by world events and trade openness
internationally, rather than the political rhetoric of the leader in place at the time. While
other economic policies changes, and the Peronist party grew and waned in popularity,
the protectionist policies were consistent throughout.
As a result, trade policy or level of trade openness cannot be used as an indicator
of populism. Just as populism does not align consistently with politics on either the right
or the left side of the political spectrum, it takes more than knowledge about trade policy
to determine whether a leader in Argentina falls under the purview of populism or not.
No matter whether it was a neoliberal military regime in the 1970s, pure Peronism,
Alfonsín desperately trying to keep the country together, or Ménem announcing to the
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IMF and the World Bank the need to eliminate trade barriers, it does not matter — there
is a legacy of a closed economy in Argentina.
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APPENDIX 1: INTERVIEW INFORMATION
The interviews were conducted with Lucas Llach, Carlos Gervasoni, Pablo
Gerchunoff, Bernardo Kosacoff, and David Kohn. Llach has a doctoral degree in history
from Harvard University, and studied economy at the Universidad Torcuato di Tella. His
primary area of study is the economic history of Argentina, and he has written
extensively on the topic, including a textbook on the macroeconomy of Argentina. He is
the current vice president of the Central Bank of Argentina. Gervasoni has a doctorate in
political science from the University of Notre Dame and two master’s degrees from
Stanford University, in political science and Latin American studies. He specialized in
topics such as democracy and public opinion, and he has edited books on the legacy of
the Kirchner administration and on the political and economic consequences of policies
of fiscal federalism enacted in Argentina. Gerchunoff is a professor at universities
throughout Argentina and has written extensively on topics of political economy.
Kosacoff is also a professor at universities throughout Argentina. He previously served as
the director of the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean
(CEPAL), which falls under the purview of the United Nations, and the president of the
Institute of Economic and Social Development (IDES). He has researched topics such as
the possibilities of economic development in Argentina and the economic performance of
Argentina. Kohn has a doctorate in economics from New York University, and his
research interests include international macroeconomy and international trade, and more
specifically the effect of credit restrictions on export decisions and the dynamic of
exporting firms (Cuerpo de profesores).
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